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ABSTRACT
In spite of its authority to claim facts￿ law is by no means neutral￿ Deeply imbued with economic and ideological interests￿
opportunistic goals and hidden motives￿ its function to guarantee political autonomy has been deeply compromised￿ This
observation￿ systematically explored in Critical Legal Studies￿ is the point of departure for this essay￿ In asking how
(a greater degree of ) political autonomy may be achieved￿ it puts forward an understanding of autonomy along three
conceptual distinctions￿ As (￿) self-governance of the individual and the community (Personal and Political Autonomy)￿ (￿)
as self-governance bereft of external and internal constraints (External and Internal Autonomy)￿ and (￿) self-governance
as the absence of constraints and the capacity to exercise governance (Negative and Positive Autonomy)￿ The main
argument is that critique is not only the prerequisite but also the essence of political autonomy￿ In discussing four authors
that have vitally contributed to the enterprise of the critique of law (Marx￿ Nietzsche￿ Weber￿ Freud)￿ it attempts to
disentangle the ways in which critique is essential for disposing of self-instituting capacity￿ I propose a reading that
does not engage with the di￿erences between their theories but stresses their commonality￿ While distinct in their analysis
of the constraints responsible for the lack of political autonomy￿ their desire for the individual’s liberation of (economic￿
ideological￿ despotic￿ subconscious) forces provides a common ground￿ Therefore￿ their critique can be understood as an
enterprise deeply indebted to Kant￿ Not as a rejection of Enlightenment but as an e￿ort to transform it from within￿
Introduction
To understand how the critique of law is relevant to
the question of political autonomy in modern political
philosophy￿ the two terms need further speci￿cation￿What
is the critique of law? What is political autonomy? The
critique of law as a ‘project’￿ has￿ very broadly speaking￿
come to realize that the law as a system and discourse is not
an autonomous sphere of society but inextricably bound to
a political process￿￿ This implies the notion that no legal
principle has an independent￿ transcendent derivation but is
made by humans on speci￿c terms in the context of speci￿c
circumstances￿ with speci￿c interests and preferences￿
The enterprise of critique of law￿ the insight that ‘law
is not just law’￿ has taken very di￿erent forms￿ A common
starting point can￿ however￿ be seen in the shift away from
the perception of law as something that is god-given or
directly derived from nature as part of the larger project
of enlightenment￿ Accepting that law is not the deduction
of the will of god opens up the possibility to re￿ect upon
what law ought to be (normative jurisprudence) in addition
to what law is (analytical jurisprudence)￿ Questions on the
goal or purpose of law can￿ hence￿ enter the discussion￿ One
of the ￿rst proponents of this is Bentham￿who wants law to
be useful￿ another stance is put forward by Kant who sees
law as the means to guarantee freedom or autonomy in a
society￿
This objective￿ autonomy￿ is the common denominator
of all critique of law￿ as I would like to argue￿ however
di￿erent in their attempts￿ achieving (a greater degree of)
autonomy is what all critics of law try to do￿ Whether by
exposing law as a political project that serves the interests
of the ruling class (Marx)￿ demonstrating that values and
norms are determined by speci￿c events (Nietzsche)￿ calling
for a regime that is not dependent upon despotism (Weber)
or demonstrating in how far humans are constrained by
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￿Referring to the critique of law as a project￿ allows to account for the fact that it is a complex undertaking that entails
various interrelated tasks and operates with certain costs and limitations￿
￿This is concisely explained byTaylor￿whoposits that “as an institution￿ law attempts to incorporate the needs and goals
of the diverse interests that make up society￿ this is inevitably a political process￿ Both the de￿nition and the achievement
of legal principles are the results of political struggles￿ both historical and contemporary￿ [￿ ￿ ￿ ] Just as legal reasoning￿ so
are legal principles products of practical reason and political processes” (Taylor ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿
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the unconsciousness (Freud) – the goal is always￿ whether
explicitly or implicitly￿ autonomy￿
The common ground of these accounts is that they
see law as the instrument to achieve self-governance￿
This is the common denominator that emerges out of
the several strands of critique of law￿ That a critique
of law precedes political autonomy￿ is the hypothesis put
forward￿ Understanding political autonomy both on a
collective level (as the means to realize self-governance of
the community by the community in establishing law as
a derivative of the will of the political community as the
legitimate source of law)￿ as well on an individual level￿ as
the prerequisite of self-governance￿ this paper will brie￿y
discuss four authors and conclude with a discussion on
critique and self-governance￿ asking to what extent these
may be concurrent or mutually dependent￿
Political Autonomy
Very broadly￿ autonomy may be understood as
self-governance￿￿ It is the central value in the Kantian
tradition and￿ more broadly￿ modernity￿ To understand
what this term entails￿ it can be helpful to re￿ect upon
autonomy along the following distinctions￿ (￿) personal
versus political autonomy￿ (￿) external versus internal
autonomy￿ and (￿) positive versus negative autonomy￿
Personal versus political autonomy
Self-governance of an individual versus self-governance of
a community
Autonomy can refer to the self-governance of an
individual or a group￿While the ￿rst refers to the autonomy
of an individual to act on his or her own terms￿ the latter
refers to the self-governance of a group of persons￿ a
community - short￿ a political entity￿
Acting politically autonomous is then understood in
relation to concepts of civil liberties and human rights￿ This
could imply￿scal and institutional independence of another
community￿ A very uncompromised version￿ of such
political autonomy has been put forward by Castoriadis￿
who calls for a society that produces its own institutions
(as opposed to deriving them nature￿ god or any other
transcendental entity)￿ Committed to the Greek ideal of
democracy as a fully-￿edged direct democracy￿ autonomy
according to Castoriadis is only ful￿lled if shared equally
between all members￿ Autonomy is the full realization
of the political will by the people￿ in that they create
their institutions￿ in that “’we make the laws￿ we know
it￿ and thus we are responsible for our laws and have
to ask ourselves every time￿ ‘Why this law rather than
another one?’￿” and that￿ as a result￿ the collectivity might
again take their institutions up and transform them” (qtd￿
in Ojeili ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿ The dominant strand of ideas of
democracy￿ of course￿ usually o￿er much more modest
versions￿ Kelsen￿ for instance￿ is readily willing to accept
three key compromises to democracy￿ (￿) political freedom
as the best proxy to natural freedom (since natural freedom
doesn’t exist or would lead to unbearable conditions
in a Hobbesian sense) (￿) representation instead of full
participation￿ and (￿) majority principles in lieu of full
consensus￿
External versus internal autonomy
Self-governance devoid of external constraints versus
self-governance devoid of internal constraints
Usually￿ autonomy is understood as freedom from
external constraints￿ Another perspective is to understand
it as freedom from internal constraints￿ Internal constraints
hindering self-governance could￿ for example￿ be the
desire to conform to society’s expectations but also certain
psychological conditionings determining human action￿
Freud is the main proponent of that stance￿ Following
his argument￿ self-governance is constrained due to the
overarching in￿uence of the unconsciousness governing
the actions￿ Castoriadis’ vision of political autonomy
implies both an external as well an internal￿ psychological
dimension of autonomy as Ojeili elaborates￿ “Castoriadis
was calling for the integration of “the revolutionary
signi￿cation of psychoanalysis” into socialist theory by
￿￿￿￿￿ and he became a practicing psychoanalyst in the
￿￿￿￿s￿ For Castoriadis￿ psychoanalytic thought￿ like
libertarian politics￿ has autonomy as its goal￿ Again￿
autonomy signi￿es lucid and deliberate self-knowledge
and self-regulation￿ rather than regulation by another (the
‘other’ in psychoanalytic terms)￿ The end of analysis￿the
achievement of maturity would mean the ability to live with
the Abyss￿ the clear knowledge of the mortality of that
which we create￿ of our social institutions￿ and of our own
person￿ This “ethic of mortality” would mean a break from
the assumed omnipotence and immortality of the alienated
person￿ from the eternity promised by the ideologies of
heteronomous societies￿ and from the modern phantasm of
full rational mastery” (Ojeili ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿ As Doyle speci￿es￿
“Castoriadis rede￿ned individual autonomy in Freudian
terms￿ as the creation of a new type of relationship between
the conscious and the unconscious as part of an ongoing
￿Deriving from Greek￿ the word autonomy consists of the pre￿x - auto- ￿self￿ and the su￿x ￿law￿￿
￿As Ojeili points out￿ “Castoriadis’ project of autonomy contains a robust utopian dimension￿ Receiving his political
inheritance from the broad libertarian socialist tradition￿ Castoriadis continues to challenge the domination of state and
capital and to insist on the liberatory possibilities of direct democracy” (Ojeili ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿
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attempt to draw on the resources of the conscious mind to
counter the domination of the alien meanings emanating
from the unconscious” (Doyle ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿ In so far￿ it
seems righteous that Doyle speaks of Castoriadis theory as
‘marrying Marx and Freud’￿
Positive versus negative autonomy
Self-governance as the absence of constraints versus
self-governance as the capacity to exercise governance
Usually autonomy is conceptualized negatively as the
absence of constraints￿ Interpreting it positively couldmean
to conceptualize it as the capacity to act in exercising social
or group rights as a means of self-governance of political
autonomy￿ Either way￿ regardless of the speci￿c de￿nition￿
autonomy is an ideal rather than a reality￿￿ Perhaps it
is only Kant who believed in the possibility of its full
realization￿ committed to the idea of emancipation from
religion and superstition￿ tradition￿ and despotism￿ Most of
his successors explain why it can’t be realized – without￿
however￿ losing the hope to at least increase its degree￿with
law as key to this endeavor￿
The Critique of Law
Marx
So how committed is Marx to autonomy? Marx contributes
to the enterprise of the critique on law by showing in
what ways law is subject to economics￿ The law’s claim to
objectivity is rejected byMarx in showing how law is not the
law of and for all but the result of and serving very particular
interests￿ According to Marx￿ law is little more than the
re￿ection of economic inequalities in society with law as a
mirror of dominant economic interests (also cf￿ with Taylor
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿ In order to realize political autonomy￿ Marx
wants to overthrow this order￿
Nietzsche
Nietzsche’s’ contribution to the ‘project of the critique of
modern law’ lies in the ‘discovery’ of the arbitrariness of
norms￿ values￿ morals￿ He discredits the law’s claim to
objectivity by unveiling that every norm￿ value or moral is
bound to speci￿c events – including law￿
Questioning that ‘something can emerge out of nothing’
on a very basic level￿ he raises awareness for the fact that
moral values have historically emerged rather than being
given (by god or any other metaphysical entity)￿ With
Nietzsche god is dead and meaning is exclusively created
by the individual￿ laws are human-made￿ to some extent
random￿ determined by speci￿c events￿ power battles and
ideologies￿￿ A critique of law in that sense acknowledges
that law￿ as anything else￿ is subject to a certain ‘narrative’￿
the result of a distinct genealogy￿ Autonomy is looked for by
equipping the individual with the ability to look behind the
facade of supposedly neutral norms and objective law￿ In
that sense￿Marx andNietzsche have something in common￿
Both unveil how the irrationalist tendencies of law is in fact￿
in spite of its authority to claim facts￿Marx in demonstrating
how law is by nomeans the result of a rational procedure but
imbued with the interests of the dominant class￿ Nietzsche
by exposing how the values underlying law are random to a
large extent￿ Self-governance is increased in that Nietzsche
opens up the possibility to trace the genealogy of norms
and￿ by explaining it￿making it available to every one￿
Weber
What is Weber’s contribution to the ‘project of the critique
of law’? Weber has a very special standing in the critique of
law￿ Both aware of the critique of Marx￿ and Nietzsche￿
who expose the irrationalist nature of law￿ he is deeply
committed to saving the individual from despotism in a
Kantian sense by advocating for legal formalism￿ Legal
formalism here refers to a strict distinction between
law-making and law-￿nding￿ interpretation and application￿
Weber￿ from his perspective as a sociologist
acknowledges that the idea of what law is￿ is normatively
grounded but sees a way out of this dilemma￿ in applying
deductive rigor and developing an increasingly rational￿
technique in procedure to law￿ From a theoretical point of
view￿ the general development of law and procedure may
be viewed as passing through the following stages￿ ￿rst￿
charismatic legal revelation through ‘law prophets’￿ second￿
￿Foldvary for instance￿ stresses that autonomy is a matter of degree of self-governance (see Foldvary ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿
￿“His [Nietzsche’s] fundamental claim￿ one that needs￿ he says￿ to inform all kinds of historical research￿ is that the
origin of the development of a thing and its ‘ultimate usefulness’ are altogether separate￿ This is because what exists is
‘continually interpreted anew [￿￿￿] transformed and redirected to a new purpose’ by a superior power” (Ansell-Pearson
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿)
￿Weber’s theory is highly informed by Marx￿ For his meticulous engagement with Marx￿Weber has often been seen as
an internal critique of Marxism￿
￿One could argue thatWeber is Hegelian in that he acknowledges that there are dilemmas or contradictions that impede
coherence but does equally believe that these can be overcome￿
￿“Weberian substantive legal rationality is rational in the sense that it appeals only to rationally calculable factors (no
oracles or trial by battle)￿ It may also be rational in the sense that it decides according to a rule (derived from one of the
extra-juristic normative orders of the society)￿ or it may proceed ad hoc” (Kennedy ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿)￿
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empirical creation and ￿nding of law by legal honoratiores￿
i￿e￿ law creation through cautery jurisprudence and
adherence to precedent￿ third￿ imposition of law by
secular or theoretic power￿ fourth and ￿nally￿ systematic
elaboration of law and professionalized administration
of justice by persons who have received their legal
training in a learned and formally logical manner￿ From
this perspective￿ the formal qualities of law emerge
as follows￿ arising in primitive legal procedure from
a combination of magically conditioned formalism and
irrationality conditioned by revelation￿ they proceed to
increasingly specialized juridical and logical rationality and
systematization￿ sometimes passing through the detour of
theoretically or patrimonially conditioned substantive and
informal expediency￿ Finally￿ they assume￿ at least form
an external viewpoint￿ an increasingly logical sublimation
and deductive rigor and develop an increasingly rational
technique in procedure” (Weber ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿
The impartiality that Weber demands is targeted at
law-￿nding and interpretation￿￿￿ The role of the jurist is￿
hence￿ that of a mechanical operator of legal logic￿ a neutral
agent￿ whose preferences are left out of the process￿
To some extent￿ Weber thereby manages to reconcile
the ‘irrationalist’ strand of critique (Marx￿ Nietzsche) with
Kant and Bentham￿ He acknowledges that there have
been unequal power relations at work in reading Marx
and taking him seriously￿￿ but also rejects that economic
forces have been decisive alone￿￿￿ He stresses that ideas
matter (Nietzsche) and￿ nevertheless￿ hopes for the better
in rationalizing￿ ‘enlightening’ things (Kant)￿ believing that
law is a useful tool for that (Bentham)￿ My argument follows
Feldman’s interpretation of Weber’s theory of law here￿
who contents the notion that Weber’s theory of law is not
fundamentally inconsistent￿ as often argued but instead￿
as a sociologist building on neo-Kantian metaphysics￿
Weber explores the inconsistencies that are inherent within
Western society itself￿ including its legal systems￿
While it remains contested￿ in how far Weber was
an adherent to democracy￿ his theory certainly allows to
set o￿ for new shores￿ It is Kelsen￿ a student of Weber￿
who becomes the advocate of democracy￿ Signi￿cantly
in￿uences by Plato￿ and relying on Rousseau in believing
that a state of nature would be unbearable￿ he calls
for a neutral law devoid of ideology￿ The state is in
consequence little more than a conglomerate of law whose
focus is to preserve a neutral judicial order￿ To some
extent￿ Kelsen￿ hence radicalizes Weber in that he tries to
neutralize everything￿ However￿ his argument lags behind
Weber’s since his axioms remain quite weak￿ While Weber
acknowledges that there is something irrational to sciences
(some sort of spark of inspiration)￿ Kelsen rejects this and
instead relies on some sort of hypothesis of a ￿ctitious
￿Grundnorm￿￿ from which all other norms are deducted￿
He also discredits the validity of philosophy￿ Given these
rather weak assumptions￿ it may come as no surprise that
Kelsen did never rise to the prestige of Weber￿ who hopes
to save the individual from the arbitrary and tyrannic reign
of despotism￿ by formalizing procedures￿ By formalizing
procedures￿ he hopes to spare the individual of the arbitrary
and tyrannic reign of despotism￿￿￿
The solution he proposes is that of an increasingly
rationalized￿ predominantly bureaucratic mode of
organizing society￿￿￿ in which it is formal procedures rather
than the sentiment or preferences that constitute order to
save the individual from domination and oppression￿￿￿
￿￿“Weber’s ideal type of substantively rational legal thought succumbs￿ in his theory￿ to LFR because LFR is superior
both in that it provides calculability for the addressees of the legal order and because it permits a sharp separation between
norm formulation and administration￿ whether the formulator is an absolute monarch or a parliament” (Kennedy ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿)￿
￿￿“We shall only recall that the great di￿erences in the line of development have been essentially in￿uenced ￿rst￿ by the
diversity of political power relationships￿ which￿ [￿ ￿ ￿ ] have resulted in very di￿erent degrees of power for the imperium
vis-à-vis the power of kinship groups￿ the folk community and the status group￿ second by the relations between the
theoretic and the secular powers￿ and￿ third￿ by the di￿erences in the structure of the ‘legal notables’ signi￿cant for the
development of a given law￿ di￿erences which also were largely dependent upon political factors”￿ (Weber ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿
￿￿“Economic conditions have [￿ ￿ ￿ ] everywhere played an important role but they have nowhere been decisive alone and
by themselves” (Weber ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿
￿￿“The law is drawn into antiformal directions￿ moreover￿ by all those powers which demand that it be more than a
mere means of pacifying con￿icts of interest￿ These forces include the demand for substantive justice by certain social
class interests and ideologies￿ they also include the tendencies inherent in certain forms of political authority of either
authoritarian or democratic character concerning the ends of law which are respectively appropriate to them￿ and also
the demand of the ‘laity’ for a system of justice which should be intelligible to them￿ ￿nally￿ as we have seen￿ anti-formal
tendencies are being promoted by the ideologically rooted power aspirations on the legal profession itself” (Weber ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿)￿
￿￿“Weber saw the state as a territorially-de￿ned￿ established political and bureaucratic order that enjoys a monopoly of
the legitimate use of force￿ And it is the conviction that this political and bureaucratic order is autonomous form wider
social and economic forces that is at the heart of Weber’s analysis” ( Jackmann ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿)￿
￿￿What happens if this bureaucratization is fully installed￿ is covered by Arendt￿who has termed theNiemandsherrschaft
– a type of regime in which nobody can be held responsible anymore￿
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Freud
How does Freud criticize law and try to foster autonomy?
Freud unveils two aspects that are vital in those terms￿
First￿ that there is a sub consciousness that the individual
has no or very little access to￿ and￿ second￿ that this
sub consciousness has a massive impact on the actions
of humans￿￿￿ This inevitably results in a high degree of
suspicion towards the actor￿ Judges￿ as well as any other
actors￿ are to a large extent driven by hidden motives￿
Freud is discrediting law’s claim to objectivity by
demonstrating that it is the id rather than anything else
that accounts for decisions￿ while the ego (and law) shrink
to a plaything of forces￿ However strong this external
psychological critique of legal substance is￿ it does leave
some hope for autonomy￿ The way to self-governance here
is the discovery of the hidden motives that drive actions￿
By rationalizing these unconscious forces behind actions￿
i￿e￿ tracing their origins￿ the individual increases his or her
room for maneuver￿
Conclusion￿ The Critique of Law as
a Prerequisite to Political Autonomy
The goal of discussing Marx￿ Nietzsche￿ Weber and
Freud was to show￿ in how far all concerned with
autonomy in some way or another￿ Marx aims to
realize autonomy by liberating the individual of oppressive
economic forces￿ Nietzsche by liberating it from the
oppression of presumably transcendentally derived values￿
Weber by saving it from oppressive political forces and
Freud by attempting to rescue the individual from the
id that determines the action￿ This is at the core of
all their analyses￿ tracing what the oppressive forces are
(economics￿ values￿ despotism￿ the unconsciousness) and￿
in a second step￿ getting them out of the way to emancipate
the individual and achieve self-governance￿
At the center inevitably remains Kant’s idea of
enlightenment as the human’s emergence from nonage￿￿￿
While Kant attributes an entirely di￿erent reason to
this nonage ( some sort of self-imposed laziness that
can be easily overcome through the will)￿ the four
discussed authors see obstacles to freedom in historically
emerged societal structures￿ i￿e￿ economic forces (Marx)￿
values (Nietzsche)￿ unformalized structures (Weber) or the
psychological constitution (Freud)￿ Also￿ the proposed
resolutions to achieve autonomy￿ di￿er￿ However￿ the ￿rst
step of all analyses remains the same￿ Critique￿ Challenging
the assumption that legal reasoning is ￿distinct￿ as a method
for reaching correct results￿ from ethical and political
discourse in general￿ [that] law is an autonomous system of
rules and concepts” (Kennedy qtd￿ in Taylor ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿) is
the ￿rst step to more self-governance￿
In unveiling that neither the state or the law have
been￿ nor are neutral￿ value-free arbiters￿ independent
of and una￿ected by social and economic relations (see
Taylor ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿ allows imagining a law where equality
is increased by balancing these unjust power relations￿
Accepting that law involves subjective choice and is imbued
with values￿ opens up the possibility of establishing law that
contributes to a more humane￿ egalitarian￿ and democratic
society￿ Put di￿erently￿ acknowledging that the claim of
law to realize self-governance has failed￿ allows thinking
of a law that could reinstate self-governance￿ While this
may seem contradictory (How can something that regulates
limits (choices) enforce greater freedom?)￿ it does not
have to be as convincingly explains elaborating on Kant￿
“Autonomy has typically meant a certain independence
from constraint￿ so how then can a meaningful conception
of autonomy be constituted by the constraints of moral
duty? The answer to this question is that these constraints
are themselves a product of self-legislation￿ autonomy is
not inconsistent with constraints per se but rather with
constraints imposed on an agent by someone else￿ In the
case of Kantian personal autonomy￿ this self-legislation has
two facets￿ First￿ the imperfect duties of self-perfection
and bene￿cence are creations of our own pure practical
reason￿ maxims inconsistent with these two duties cannot
be universalized (as they lead to a contradiction in will)
and therefore violate the ￿rst formulation of the categorical
imperative￿ which itself follows from our autonomous will”
(Robert Taylor ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿-￿￿￿)￿ Critique is￿ hence￿ the
decisive step for change￿￿￿
Autonomy￿ that is “the recognition and acceptance of
humanity’s responsibility for its own norms￿ values and
laws￿ as its self-instituting capacity” (Doyle ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿
has an internal and external dimension of which both are
vital for political autonomy￿ as the essence of democratic
praxis￿ On the collective or external level￿ it entails
that law ensures self-governance by deriving its legitimacy
derived from the will of the people￿ This is￿ however￿
not enough￿ since self-governance does also entail freedom
from internal constraints￿ As Doyle seizes￿ “Modern
autonomy involves a lot more than self-government￿ It
￿￿It can be argued that Freud is here quite close toMarx￿ Both attempt to display the underlying forces of society (interest
of the bourgeoisie￿motives of the unconsciousness) that constitute the order behind the facade￿
￿￿Translations of the term Unmündigkeit Kant originally are a little bit tricky here￿ while some have translated it with
‘political immaturity’￿ the term nonage seems more appropriate￿
￿￿ As Dworkin points out￿ critique is ￿a second-order capacity of persons to re￿ect critically upon their ￿rst-order
preferences￿ desires￿ wishes￿ and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these [￿ ￿ ￿ ]” (qtd￿ in Robert
Taylor ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿
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consists in historical self-production [￿ ￿ ￿ ]” (Doyle ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿) [￿ ￿ ￿ ] This self-production is achieved by tracing what
has produced the self by means of self-knowledge that
results in self-direction￿ In other words￿ an awareness of
the structures￿ ideas￿ forces etc￿ that have impacted and
produced the self in order to potentially liberated oneself
from theses forces￿
It is political freedom that is the most important feature
of democratic societies￿ inspiring modernity dating back to
Kant’s perception of enlightenment and it is the overarching
task of critique to unveil all the oppressive￿ disabling
conditions hindering the self-governance of individuals as
a crucial step to change them￿ The critique (of law)￿ is
hence the prerequisite of political autonomy￿ It is important
to note that the critique of law hasn’t stopped with Freud￿
Foucault and Adorno￿ for instance￿ have equally engaged in
questions of political autonomy￿ departing from an analysis
of the obstacles that stand in its way￿ However di￿erent
their approaches￿ the concern remains a deeply Kantian
one￿￿￿ Autonomy and critique are deeply intertwined in
their theories￿ As well as Foucault￿ Adorno believes that
e￿ective resistance to a society that ‘governs’ us consists￿ in
the ￿rst instance￿ in critical re￿ection on how society limits
our capacity for autonomous thought￿ (also cf￿ with Cook
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿ This critical re￿ection is the basis of autonomy
in that it precedes ways to emancipate oneself from these
limits￿
As Adorno puts it￿ in rejecting Marx’s claim that the
point is to change the world rather than merely to interpret
it￿ “one reasonwhy theworldwas not changedwas probably
the fact that it was too little interpreted” (qtd￿ in Cook ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿)￿ Critique itself is ‘a comportment￿ a form of praxis’￿
“more akin to transformative praxis than a comportment
that is compliant for the sake of praxis’ precisely because it
involves resistance” (qtd￿ in Cook ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿)￿ In this sense￿
critique does not only precede political autonomy but is the
essence of it￿
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￿￿Given Foucault’s criticisms of Kantian and Enlightenment￿ as well as Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s analysis of the
enlightenment as yet another mysti￿cation￿ it may come as a surprise to label their attempts as Kantian￿ However￿ while
they reject the transcendental as the origin of enlightenment￿ writing from a standpoint of deep disillusionment￿ both of
their works do aim to enforce political autonomy by pointing to its obstacles￿ As well as for the other authors discussed￿ I
do want to propose a reading of Kant and his successors that does not engage with the di￿erences between their theories
but stresses the common aim of political autonomy￿ The discussed theories are￿ thus￿ no total critique of Enlightenment
beliefs and values but are better understood as attempts to transform them from within (also cf￿ with Hendricks ￿￿￿￿)￿
Against the background that shows that the enlightenment has failed￿ the critiques do not give up on Enlightenment but
take up the thread in various ways to nevertheless come to self-governance￿
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